Across very different industries — from insolvency and water to auditing — the same pattern repeatedly emerges: the people responsible for regulating an industry are often too closely connected to the people they are supposed to regulate.

Conflicts of interest arise. Warning signs are missed. Scandals emerge. There is public outrage, an inquiry or review, promises of reform — and then, all too often, business continues as usual.

This event examines how self-regulation, industry-led regulation and regulatory capture can turn regulation into little more than an appearance of accountability.

We will explore three very different case studies:

• UK insolvency — where insolvency practitioners can face significant conflicts of interest, while regulation remains fragmented between professional bodies that also represent the profession.
• The UK water industry — where companies have historically been responsible for monitoring and reporting their own environmental performance, raising fundamental questions about whether a polluter can effectively mark its own homework.
• Australian audit — where scandals involving major accounting firms have highlighted questions around professional self-regulation, conflicts of interest, whistleblower protection and the ability to hold firms themselves accountable.

Despite their differences, these cases reveal strikingly similar problems: conflicts of interest, revolving doors, weak sanctions, inadequate whistleblower protection and regulators that can become too close to the industries they oversee.

So what does effective regulation actually look like?

Is it possible for an industry to regulate itself when its members’ commercial interests are at stake? Can professional bodies simultaneously represent an industry and credibly discipline it? And when regulation fails, who holds the regulators themselves to account?

This event will consider whether the answer lies in independent regulation, meaningful enforcement, greater transparency and genuine accountability outside the industries being regulated.

Because if those responsible for regulating an industry are ultimately accountable to the industry itself, can we really call it regulation?